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THE UK FORENSIC SCIENCE REGULATOR:  
A MODEL FOR FORENSIC SCIENCE 
REGULATION? 
Dr. Carole McCartney* & Emmanuel Amoako† 
ABSTRACT 
The use of an array of scientific techniques and technologies is 
now considered customary within criminal justice, with technological 
developments and scientific advancements regularly added to the 
crime investigator’s arsenal. However, the scientific basis, reliability, 
and fallibility of the application of such “forensic science” (and the 
resulting scientific evidence) continues to come under intense 
scrutiny. In response to apparently irremediable problems with the 
quality of scientific evidence in the United Kingdom (UK), the 
government created the role of “Forensic Science Regulator” in 2007. 
The introduction of a regulator was intended to establish quality 
standards for all forensic science providers in the UK, create a level 
playing field in the forensic services market, and grant assurances 
that all providers were producing reliable and robust scientific 
evidence. A decade on, there remain questions over the effectiveness 
of this model of forensic regulation. Although there has been 
significant progress with initial aims and objectives and broad 
stakeholder engagement, the Forensic Science Regulator still lacks 
meaningful powers, and significant gaps in regulation remain. 
Accreditation is not only inconsistent but may be superficial. The 
Forensic Science Regulator faces serious resource restrictions with 
debilitating limitations on the Regulator’s capacities, while wider 
austerity measures throughout the criminal justice system hamper 
efforts to raise standards in forensic science.  
This Article will detail the first ten years of the Forensic Science 
Regulator, outlining successes and ongoing challenges. It will 
demonstrate that the UK model of forensic regulation has proven 
only partially effective at minimizing the risks associated with 
forensic science, while ensuring that the criminal justice system can 
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continue to secure high quality forensic scientific evidence that is 
robust, reliable, and sustainable. 
INTRODUCTION 
While the forensic potential of scientific knowledge, 
experimentation, and testing has long been recognized, the reliability 
of forensic scientific evidence has come under intense scrutiny in 
recent years.1 Considered a “state of the union” report with broad 
acceptance and international pertinence, the 2009 United States 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report criticized inter alia: the 
paucity of underlying research; lack of standards and accreditation of 
laboratories; dramatic inconsistencies in levels of training of forensic 
personnel; inattention to risks posed by cognitive contamination (so-
called contextual bias); unprincipled variation in terminology and 
forms of expression of scientific opinions; widespread failures to 
disclose limitations and uncertainties in reports and testimony; 
insufficient detail and explanation in reports; and a general lack of 
funding and leadership across the forensic sciences.2 In late 2016, the 
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 
(PCAST) released a further damning report on forensic science, 
focusing on the lack of validity of many forensic science techniques.3 
Such concerns are mirrored around the globe. In a comparative study 
of forensic practice in the United States, Switzerland, and Australia, 
Gary Edmond and Joelle Vuille suggest that critical failings in 
                                                                                                                 
 1. We use the term “forensic scientific evidence” to encompass all evidence used in the criminal 
justice process that has been undertaken by “forensic practitioners” or generated using recognized 
“forensic” techniques or applications. There is a lot of “scientific evidence” that would not fit under this 
banner, such as medical evidence, or evidence of engineers, etc. However, the term “forensic evidence” 
is often cast far wider, and includes evidence that most people would not recognize as being generated 
by “forensic science” techniques. We hope that “forensic scientific evidence” is thus broad enough to 
include all forensic disciplines and techniques but not so broad as to encompass all potential evidence. 
 2. See generally COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 
(2009) [hereinafter A PATH FORWARD] 
 3. See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH. (PCAST), EXEC. OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING 
SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (2016). 
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forensic science are ubiquitous.4 Yet, even domestic attempts to 
regulate forensic science remain in their infancy, with any 
international oversight scarcer still and of limited impact.   
Perhaps uniquely,5 the UK6 has dedicated efforts to answering 
critics of forensic science by attempting to ensure the uniform 
provision of high quality forensic scientific evidence, primarily 
through the creation of the Forensic Science Regulator (FSR or the 
Regulator). Established in 2007, the FSR was tasked with 
establishing and monitoring quality standards and ensuring the 
accreditation of suppliers of forensic services as well as dealing with 
complaints and providing advice to the government.7 However, 
questions remain as to whether the regulatory model adopted is 
effective. On the one hand, the FSR was meant to create generic 
standards for all forensic science providers in the UK and provide “a 
light touch” in steering forensic service providers towards adopting 
effective quality assurance systems and gaining appropriate 
accreditation.8 But has this “light touch” rendered the Regulator a 
paper tiger, leaving gaps in regulation and providing superficial 
accreditation? Along with the rest of the public sector in the UK, the 
Regulator also faces serious resource restrictions and operates within 
a broader criminal justice system simultaneously being starved of 
government funding. 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Gary Edmond & Joelle Vuille, Comparing the Use of Forensic Science Evidence in Australia, 
Switzerland & the United States: Transcending the Adversarial/Non-Adversarial Dichotomy 54 
JURIMETRICS J. 221, 251 (2014). 
 5. Although we cannot say definitively, we are currently unaware of any international counterparts 
or equivalent efforts that have taken the same approach to forensic science regulation in other countries. 
 6. The Forensic Science Regulator has jurisdiction over England and Wales, but both Scotland and 
Northern Ireland voluntarily agreed to work in partnership with the Regulator and continue to work 
within the same guidelines. About Us, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/forensic-science-regulator/about, [https://perma.cc/Y95J-
FMC7] (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
 7. ANDREW RENNISON, THE FORENSIC SCIENCE REGULATOR BUSINESS PLAN 2008/09-2010/11 at 
1, 2 (2008), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118922/Forensic_Science
_Regulator_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2P7-NCMR] [hereinafter BUSINESS PLAN 2008]. 
 8.  Id. at 3. 
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This Article details the work of the first ten years of the FSR, 
summarizing successes and ongoing challenges. It questions whether 
the Regulator has achieved the aim of ensuring high quality forensic 
science provision via examination of annual reports and business 
plans as well as related documents, and it considers issues pertaining 
to forensic science provision in the UK to draw conclusions 
regarding the success of the regulation model employed. 
I.   Creating the Forensic Science Regulator 
During the massive expansion of forensic science provision in 
England and Wales in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries, there were a series of highly critical reports commenting 
upon the quality of forensic science provision and the risks associated 
with poor quality forensic scientific evidence. The 1993 Report of the 
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (the Runciman Report), 
established in light of a series of infamous “Irish terrorism” 
miscarriages of justice, made thirteen recommendations specific to 
forensic science.9 Of these, the establishment of an oversight body 
was deemed a priority. The Runciman Report recommended the 
creation of a Forensic Science Advisory Council (FSAC) to serve as 
a regulatory body for the forensic science community and an 
independent source of advice.10 Just three years later, the 1996 
Assessment and Implications of Centrifuge Contamination in the 
Trace Explosive Section of the Forensic Explosives Laboratory at 
Fort Halstead (the Caddy Report) evaluated the serious 
contamination at a military forensic explosives laboratory and 
advocated registration of individual forensic practitioners, while also 
recommending the creation of an Inspectorate of Forensic Sciences.11 
It was not until 1999, however, that any reforms were initiated, 
with the establishment of the Council for the Registration of Forensic 
                                                                                                                 
 9. THE ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIM. JUST., REPORT, 1991, CM 2263, at 211 (UK). 
 10. Id. 
 11. BRIAN CADDY, ASSESSMENT AND IMPLICATIONS OF CENTRIFUGE CONTAMINATION IN THE 
TRACE EXPLOSIVE SECTION OF THE FORENSIC EXPLOSIVES LABORATORY AT FORT HALSTEAD 6–7, 23, 
42 (1996). 
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Practitioners (CRFP). This register was intended to provide courts 
with a single point of reference through publication of a list of 
“competent” forensic practitioners; ensure that registered 
practitioners maintained competence; and discipline registered 
practitioners who did not meet the required standards of “safe, 
competent practice.”12 The CRFP would thus assure courts that those 
presenting themselves at trial as expert witnesses were competent to 
fulfill that role, making it a welcome and important step in that 
regard. However, as a voluntary and self-selective system of 
individual accreditation, the CRFP stopped far short of bringing 
comprehensive and rigorous scrutiny to bear upon forensic science 
and expert witnesses, many of whom were still able to testify in court 
regardless of their registration status.13 The register was therefore 
impotent, and continuing efforts to register practitioners were 
proving futile. And so, the CRFP, ostensibly due to financial 
difficulties, closed in 2009.14 
Meanwhile in November 2004, in response to rapid developments 
in the forensic marketplace prompted by the partial privatization of 
the previously publicly funded national Forensic Science Service15 
and the criticisms of the continued lack of regulation in light of high-
profile miscarriages of justice involving “experts,” the UK Forensic 
Science Society changed its status to one of a professional body.16 
The Forensic Science Society partially took up the role played by the 
                                                                                                                 
 12. ANDREW RENNISON, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, A REVIEW OF THE OPTIONS FOR THE 
ACCREDITATION OF FORENSIC PRACTITIONERS 17 (2009), 
http://library.college.police.uk/docs/homeoffice/Review-of-Forensic-Practiti1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7DGZ-9DJQ]. 
 13. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, FORENSIC SCIENCE ON TRIAL, 2004–05, HC 96-I, at 
62–63 (UK). 
 14. Jamie Doward, Forensic Science Skills Threatened by Funding Withdrawal, GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 
2009, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2009/apr/05/forensic-science-government-
funding [https://perma.cc/ED5D-9JHE]. 
 15. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, FORENSIC SCIENCE ON TRIAL, 2004–05, HC 96-II, at 
Ev 26 (UK). The Forensic Science Service became a “Government Owned Company,” a for-profit 
company, wholly owned by the UK Government, with the intention being to sell to a private interest in 
the coming years. Id. at Ev 3. 
 16. About Us, CHARTERED SOC’Y OF FORENSIC SCIS., http://www.csofs.org/About-us 
[https://perma.cc/8DGL-47BN] (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
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CRFP by launching a Continuing Professional Development scheme 
for members, a requirement of Chartered Forensic Practitioner 
status.17 Although bodies, such as the Chartered Society, aim to 
promote and develop forensic science quality standards and practice, 
they represent a wider body of interests, including forensic education 
and management, and do not provide specific certification or 
assurance of practitioner competence. 
With neither the Runciman Report’s nor the Caddy Report’s 
recommendations leading to a regulatory body beyond the deficient 
CRFP and with criticism of forensic science unabated, the House of 
Commons Science and Technology Select Committee (Select 
Committee) revisited the issue in its 2005 report Forensic Science on 
Trial, making sixty recommendations on the regulation of forensic 
science, the training of scientists, and related issues.18 The Select 
Committee again recommended that the government establish a 
FSAC to oversee forensic science and provide independent and 
impartial advice.19 The FSAC would also be ideally placed to review, 
or to commission inspections of, the use of forensic science across 
the whole of the criminal justice system and to propose 
improvements where necessary. After consultation subsequent to the 
report, the government decided that a named individual would be 
appointed Regulator, emulating other regulatory structures, with 
responsibility for overseeing the quality of forensic science in 
England and Wales.20 The new role was announced in July 2007, 
explaining that the officeholder would advise the government and 
criminal justice system on standards; identify and create new or 
improved quality standards; provide advice and guidance to providers 
on how to demonstrate compliance; and ensure the monitoring of 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Certificate of Professional Competence (CPC), CHARTERED SOC’Y OF FORENSIC SCIS., 
http://www.csofs.org/Certificate-of-Professional-Competence-CPC [https://perma.cc/FB8A-FZ6R] (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
 18. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, supra note 13, at 82–89. 
 19. Id. at 3. 
 20. Id. at 5. 
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such standards.21 The Regulator was to be supported by a FSAC with 
members from stakeholder bodies.22 
A.   The Role and Objectives of the Forensic Science Regulator 
The first business plan of the new FSR in March 2008 outlined the 
role of the Regulator and a set of objectives as well as a plan for the 
first two years of operation.23 The FSR began by identifying what the 
criminal justice system requires of forensic science providers: 
 
(1) The delivery of forensic science services, using the 
appropriate available scientific techniques, 
according to the highest professional standards; 
(2) With efficiency, integrity, impartiality and accuracy 
at every stage throughout the process; 
(3) At a cost which represents best value for money, 
within timescales which meet operational needs; 
(4) Reflecting an understanding of the needs of the 
specific customer and the requirements of the 
[criminal justice system] as a whole; thereby 
(5) Maintaining and enhancing public confidence in the 
quality and reliability of forensic science in the 
[criminal justice system].24 
 
To ensure that the forensic science market could deliver on each of 
these requirements, the FSR outlined a remit that would encompass: 
 
(1) Scientific quality standards relating to 
organi[z]ations providing forensic science services 
to the [criminal justice system]; 
                                                                                                                 
 21. 12 Jul. 2007, Parl Deb HC (2007) col. 67WS (UK), 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070712/wmstext/70712m0002.htm 
[https://perma.cc/WQ9R-QPJT]. 
 22. Id. 
 23. BUSINESS PLAN 2008, supra note 7, at 1, 2, 18. 
 24. Id. at 1. 
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(2) Processes carried out within those organi[z]ations 
which affect the quality of the forensic science 
services provided to the [criminal justice system]; 
(3) New scientific techniques introduced in, or 
adopted by, such organi[z]ations, before those 
techniques are introduced; [and] 
(4) The competence of individual forensic scientists.25 
 
It was not expected that the FSR deliver all activities directly, but 
that if organizations or mechanisms already existed to create and 
monitor standards etc., that these would be used. 
In the first Forensic Science Regulator Annual Report, published 
in December 2009, the FSR set out a vision “[t]hat forensic science 
delivered to the criminal justice system in the UK will consistently 
meet the high quality standards and integrity expected by the courts 
and the general public.”26 To achieve this, the FSR was to: 
 
(1) “Provide direction and unity of approach to 
achieving forensic science quality standards across 
the UK; 
(2) Place quality at the cent[er] of all forensic science 
activities; and 
(3) Create a quality standards framework around the 
full range of forensic processes.”27 
 
The FSR’s mission was: 
 
(1) To influence the strategic management of UK 
forensic science to place quality standards at the 
heart of strategic planning; 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Id. at 20. 
 26. ANDREW RENNISON, FORENSIC SCIENCE REGULATOR ANNUAL REPORT: DECEMBER 2009 at 1 
(2009), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118900/FSR-
annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B42X-4H9V]. 
 27. Id. 
8
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 3
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss4/3
2018] UK FORENSIC SCIENCE REGULATOR 953 
(2) To develop a set of ‘industry specific’ quality 
standards for all forensic processes across the 
dimensions of provider, practitioner and method; 
(3) To establish, through the United Kingdom 
Accreditation Service (UKAS), effective 
compliance assessment procedures; 
(4) To use the Forensic Science Advisory Council as a 
source of independent and authoritative advice; 
(5) To maintain the use of specialist groups of domain 
experts as the vehicle to deliver valid quality 
standards; and 
(6) To engage with the full range of stakeholders in 
order to consult widely.28 
 
In February 2013, the second Forensic Science Regulator Business 
Plan: 2012 to 201729 was swiftly followed by the third Forensic 
Science Regulator Business Plan: 2013 to 2014,30 when a change of 
personnel took place and the new Regulator set out their priorities.31 
Each document outlined aims accompanied by plans to achieve these 
aims. Both individuals who have acted in the role of Regulator32 have 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. 
 29. FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, FORENSIC SCIENCE REGULATOR BUSINESS PLAN: 2012 TO 2017 
(2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/143740/business-
plan-2012-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV5Y-G5AB]. 
 30. FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, FORENSIC SCIENCE REGULATOR BUSINESS PLAN: 2013 TO 2014, 
(2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/229450/fsr-
business-plan-1314.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY6B-ZMBF]. 
 31. These ‘Business Plans’ also appeared to fulfill the role of ‘Annual Reports,’ where accounts and 
progress would be reported as well as upcoming plans and there were no Annual Reports published 
between 2010 and 2015. 
 32. There was an ‘interim’ Regulator to set-up the FSR. Forensic Science Regulator Newsletter, 3 
FORENSIC SCI. REG. UNIT, Sept. 12, 2007, at 1, 2, http://netk.net.au/Forensic/UKFSAC.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YYX5-NZCC]. The first Regulator was Mr. Andrew Rennison. 521 Parl Deb HC 
(2011) col. 23WS (UK), https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2011-01-
13/debates/11011364000012/ForensicScienceRegulator [https://perma.cc/5JN3-RS8S]. Rennison was 
followed by Dr. Gillian Tully, who took up the role in 2013, and has recently been confirmed as 
Regulator until 2020. Forensic Sci. Regulator, Dr. Gillian Tully Reappointed in Key Role for Setting 
Standards in Forensic Science, GOV.UK (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/dr-
gillian-tully-reappointed-in-key-role-for-setting-standards-for-forensic-science [https://perma.cc/2L8T-
QSLD]. 
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stressed the importance of engagement with stakeholders, and they 
regularly meet with “specialist working groups”: forensic science 
practitioners, specialists, experts, and other stakeholders who can 
undertake their own studies and advise the Regulator on quality 
standards for specific forensic disciplines within the wider forensic 
services to ensure industry-specific quality standards. The current 
groups, each with their own terms of reference, are: 
 
(1) The FSAC, 
(2) The Contamination Specialist Group, 
(3) The Fingerprint Quality Specialist Group, 
(4) The Digital Forensics Specialist Group, 
(5) The DNA Analysis Specialist Group, 
(6) The End User Specialist Group, 
(7) The Forensic Pathology Specialist Group, 
(8) The Medical Forensics Specialist Group, 
(9) The Quality Standards Specialist Group, and 
(10) The Evidence Assessment Specialist Group.33 
 
Despite slight variations in visions and differing aims over the ten 
years since inception, the FSR role has not altered in any material 
way. The Regulator continues to be a public appointee and operates 
independently (i.e., not influenced by political pressure) working at 
arm’s length of the Home Office.34 However, the FSR is funded by 
the Home Office, and the Regulator reports to the Home Secretary 
and is supported by three civil servants (suggesting quite a short 
“arm”).35 The Regulator also acts as an advisor to the government 
and represents the UK in international fora.36 The FSR’s 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Membership, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/forensic-science-regulator/about/membership 
[https://perma.cc/A54D-SQB4] (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
 34. Id. 
 35. About Us, supra note 6. 
 36. Id. 
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responsibilities as currently articulated on the FSR website include 
the following: 
 
(1) “[I]dentifying the requirement for new or improved quality 
standards[;] 
(2) [L]eading on the development of new standards[; and] 
(3) [W]here necessary, providing advice and guidance so that 
providers of forensic science services can demonstrate 
compliance with common standards[.]”37 
 
The FSR’s attendant priorities are to see that: 
 
(1)  [F]orensic science services are delivered to 
appropriate standards (usually an international 
standard) tailored to meet the needs of the criminal 
justice system and subject to independent and 
effective assessments of quality[;] 
(2) [H]igh quality advice and guidance is provided to 
forensic science providers, ministers and others on 
the forensic science requirements of the criminal 
justice system[;] 
(3) [T]here are effective means to investigate quality 
failures and to address any issues[;] 
(4) [T]here is effective collaboration with the 
authorities in Scotland and Northern Ireland to 
achieve UK-wide quality standards[; and] 
(5) [T]he UK is a strong voice on projects to develop 
European or international standards for forensic 
science.38 
 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
11
McCartney and Amoako: The UK Forensic Science Regulator: A Model For Forensic Science R
Published by Reading Room, 2018
956 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:4 
In the discharge of these duties, the FSR continues to be advised and 
supported by the FSAC, and quality standards are established via the 
support of the nine specialist working groups.39 
The principal and immediate task of the FSR was to develop 
quality standards encompassing forensic science providers, 
practitioners, and forensic methods. The FSR was charged with 
producing a “Manual of Regulation,” defined as “a consolidated set 
of guidance which describes, in some detail, why (covering strategic 
aims and objectives) [and] how (including statement of principles to 
be adopted) the Regulator, advised by the FSAC and supported by 
Specialist Groups, will manage the whole regulatory process.”40 In 
2011, Version 1 of the FSR Codes of Practice and Conduct for 
Forensic Science Providers and Practitioners in the Criminal Justice 
System (the Codes) were published, setting out accreditation 
requirements for laboratories; a “Code of Conduct” for practitioners, 
and a similar “Code of Practice” for providers.41 
The Codes are built on the international standards ISO 17025:2005 
(which outlines the general requirements for the competence of 
testing and calibration laboratories), as interpreted by ILAC 
G19:08/2014 in the context of forensic science processes,42 and ISO 
17020 for organizations carrying out inspection.43 The Regulator 
oversees accreditation (via the UKAS) using the international 
laboratory testing ISO17025 standard for all laboratories that supply 
forensic services.44 Because ISO17025 constitutes a generic 
framework not specific to forensic laboratories, UKAS has issued 
supplementary standards and has made tailored modifications for 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Membership, supra note 33. 
 40. BUSINESS PLAN 2008, supra note 7. 
 41. FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, CODES OF PRACTICE AND CONDUCT 6 (2011), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118949/codes-practice-
conduct.pdf [https://perma.cc/348J-TAP7] [hereinafter CODES OF PRACTICE AND CONDUCT]. 
 42. FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, CODES OF PRACTICE AND CONDUCT 2 (2016), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/499850/2016_2_11_-
_The_Codes_of_Practice_and_Conduct_-_Issue_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9XA-BTXZ]. 
 43. Id. at 12. 
 44. Id. 
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forensic science. Both forensic anthropology45 and forensic 
pathology46 have their own specific Codes of Practice, while there 
are also appendices to the Codes for some disciplines, including: 
 
(1) Bloodstain pattern analysis, 
(2) DNA analysis, 
(3) Digital forensic services, 
(4) Video analysis, 
(5) Speech and audio forensic services, 
(6) Cell site analysis, 
(7) Fingerprint comparison, and 
(8) Fingermark visualization and imaging.47 
 
Accreditation of providers involves on-site assessment by 
technically competent assessors across a range of forensic 
disciplines, assessing the training and ongoing competence of 
practitioners within the organization, the validation of methods and 
tests undertaken by the organization, and evidence of impartiality in 
the organization’s activities.48 Assessment is managed on a four-year 
cycle with at least annual on-site visits by UKAS.49 Quality-related 
issues resulting from this independent accreditation assessment are 
reported to the FSR.50 Accreditation is thus intended to provide an 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Code of Practice for Forensic Anthropology, GOV.UK (Oct. 3, 2017) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/code-of-practice-for-forensic-anthropology 
[https://perma.cc/S7LD-3A7N]. 
 46. Forensic Pathology: Code of Practice, GOV.UK (Nov. 20, 2012), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/standards-for-forensic-pathology-in-england-wales-and-
northern-ireland [https://perma.cc/EN34-J3EE]. 
 47. Forensic Science Provider: Codes of Practice and Conduct, GOV.UK (Oct. 13, 2017), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/forensic-science-providers-codes-of-practice-and-
conduct#appendices [https://perma.cc/W9LU-LGW5]. 
 48. Codes of Practice and Conduct, supra note 42. 
 49. ANDREW RENNISON, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, FSR-R-618, REPORT INTO THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF A COMPLAINT RECEIVED FROM THE GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE ON 7 MARCH 
2012 REGARDING DNA EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY LGC FORENSICS 5 (2012), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118941/dna-contam-
report.pdf [https://.cc/A2WN-PQVT] [hereinafter REPORT INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES]. 
 50. GILLIAN TULLY, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, ANNUAL REPORT: NOVEMBER 2016–NOVEMBER 
2017 at 9 (2018), 
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authoritative assurance of competence in staff, the impartiality of 
activities, and the reliability of evidence generated by the 
laboratory.51 The Codes relating to practitioners are values and ideals 
that should define the profession of a forensic practitioner. In total, 
these standards are the minimum requirements expected in order to 
provide a forensic science service to the criminal justice system. 
Originally published in 2011, the Codes are updated when needed to 
incorporate relevant developments in the forensic field. Some of 
these changes have resulted in updates in 2016 (Version 3) and 2017 
(Version 4), to reflect the new Criminal Procedure Rules, the 
Criminal Practice Directions, and amendments.52 
In addition to the Codes and appendices, the FSR publishes 
detailed, stand-alone standards and guidance and currently has 
published in the following areas: 
 
(1) Forensic toxicology standards; 
(2) Sexual assault referral centres and custodial 
facilities: DNA anticontamination guidance; 
(3) Method validation in digital forensics; 
(4) Crime scene DNA: anticontamination guidance; 
(5) Laboratory DNA: anticontamination guidance; 
(6) Cognitive bias effects relevant to forensic science 
examinations; 
(7) Forensic service providers: validation guidance; 
(8) Public comment guidance; 
(9) Allele frequency databases and reporting guidance 
for the DNA-17 profiling; 
                                                                                                                 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/674761/FSRAnnual_Rep
ort_2017_v1_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BVQ-KBNS]. 
 51. Written Evidence Submitted by the UKAS (FST 0008), HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT (Mar. 2016), 
http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Science%20and
%20Technology/Forensic%20Science%20Strategy/written/31189.html [https://perma.cc/FW8V-CSVP]. 
 52. See Rules and Practice Directions, JUSTICE, www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-
rules/criminal/rulesmenu-2015 [https://perma.cc/3W6S-WEDU] (last updated Apr. 11, 2017) (providing 
access to the current version of the Criminal Procedure Rules and Criminal Practice Directions). 
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(10) Fingerprint examination: terminology, definitions, 
and acronyms; 
(11) Alcohol back calculation for road traffic 
investigations; 
(12) Provision of human tissue to the defense; 
(13) Time of death estimations; 
(14) (Draft as of January 2018) DNA mixture 
interpretation software validation; 
(15) (Draft as of January 2018) DNA mixture 
interpretation.53 
 
There are also regular updates providing legal guidance on the 
legal obligations of expert witnesses and those involved in forensic 
pathology investigations54 as well as guidance on other related issues, 
such as: Drug Driving: The Use of Legal Limits;55 Expert Report 
Content;56 Non-Technical Expert Statements;57 and Completing the 
‘History’ Section of a Forensic Pathologist’s Report.58 The FSR has 
also produced the following guidance: Protocol: Using Casework 
Material for Validation Purposes,59 Protocol on Forensic Science 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Publications, GOV.UK, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications?departments%5B%5D=forensic-science-
regulator&from_date=&keywords=&official_document_status=all&page=1&publication_filter_option=
all&to_date=&topics%5B%5D=all&world_locations%5B%5D=all [https://perma.cc/33JS-NTK4] (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2018) (browse list or use the filters on the left-hand column to find specific 
publications). 
 54. Legal Issues in Forensic Pathology and Tissue Retention: Issue 3 Guidance, GOV.UK (Dec. 10, 
2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/legal-issues-in-forensic-pathology-and-tissue-
retention-issue-2-guidance [https://perma.cc/9DQ2-NY8N]. 
 55. Drug Driving: Use of Legal Limits, Issue 2, GOV.UK (Feb. 1, 2017), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/drug-driving-use-of-legal-limits-issue-2 
[https://perma.cc/9ZVD-NM2J]. 
 56. Expert Report Content, GOV.UK (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/expert-report-content [https://perma.cc/5FU5-ZRM4]. 
 57. Non-Expert Technical Statements, GOV.UK (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/non-expert-technical-statements [https://perma.cc/76NM-
MX4T]. 
 58. Completing the ‘History’ Section of a Forensic Pathologist’s Report, GOV.UK (Sept. 26, 2014), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/completing-the-history-section-of-a-forensic-pathologists-
report [https://perma.cc/JN3B-L82V]. 
 59. Protocol: Using Casework Material for Validation Purposes, GOV.UK (Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/protocol-using-casework-material-for-validation-purposes 
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Service Archive Complaints,60 and The Use of Photographs for Non-
CJS Purposes: Draft Guidance.61 The FSR commissions regular 
audits of the work of forensic pathologists; having published a 
protocol for these audits, the FSR has published the results of five 
audits.62 Most of these documents have been published after 
extensive engagement with both practitioners and stakeholders as 
well as the public—with eighteen public consultations to date.63 
Another important role of the FSR is to investigate complaints and 
undertake reviews of performance when requested by Parliament. 
These reports are also publicly available on the website, including a 
performance review of the Scottish Police Services Authority (which 
provides all forensic science services to the Scottish police).64 There 
have been investigations into the biggest forensic providers in the 
UK, including Cellmark Forensic Services, Key Forensic Services, 
and LGC Forensics.65 In 2013, upon request by Parliament, the FSR 
also published a preliminary report on the 1970s use of sodium 
rhodizonate as a test to identify firearm discharge residue, 
concluding, however, that a full review was not warranted.66 
                                                                                                                 
[https://perma.cc/XT46-3QGS]. 
 60. Protocol on Forensic Science Service Archive Complaints, GOV.UK (Nov. 21, 2013), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/protocol-on-forensic-science-service-archive-complaints 
[https://perma.cc/D4AZ-AGWQ]. 
 61. Use of Photographs for Non-CJS Purposes: Draft Guidance, GOV.UK (Dec. 18, 2013), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/use-of-photographs-for-non-cjs-purposes-draft-guidance 
[https://perma.cc/RA77-7UUN]. 
 62. Forensic Pathology Audit, GOV.UK (Dec. 15, 2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/forensic-pathology-audit [https://perma.cc/KK8A-7YY3]. 
 63. See id. 
 64. A Performance Review of the Scottish Police Services Authority, GOV.UK (Jan. 27, 2016), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/a-performance-review-of-the-scottish-police-services-
authority [https://perma.cc/HN97-6WMB]. 
 65. LGC were sold to Eurofins, a European forensic service provider, in 2017. Eurofins to Reinforce 
Its Forensic Services Portfolio and Footprint with the Acquisition of LGC Forensics, EUROFINS (Oct. 
12, 2017), https://www.eurofins.com/media-centre/press-releases-2017/2017-10-12/ 
[https://perma.cc/5R9L-PL66]. 
 66. Report on Sodium Rhodizonate, GOV.UK (Jan. 31, 2013), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fsr-report-on-sodium-rhodizonate-testing-in-the-1970s 
[https://perma.cc/VXW7-RAVY]. 
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II.   The Forensic Science Regulator: Ten Years of Progress? 
There has been clear evidence of engagement by the FSR with a 
broad variety of stakeholders beyond those sitting within specialist 
groups and on the FSAC. In addition to an annual quality conference 
hosted by the FSR, annual reports give details of a busy schedule of 
external meetings and papers delivered at a wide variety of events. 
The latest report stresses that there is a “continued priority” to speak 
to as many “forensic experts, practitioners[,] and relevant managers 
as possible.”67 The level of engagement has been impressive and is 
going a long way toward achieving “Requirement 3” of the Forensic 
Science Regulator Annual Report: November 2014–November 2015, 
which requires a “shared understanding of quality and standards by 
all stakeholders, including commissioners of forensic science, expert 
practitioners, researchers and all end users, including the police, the 
prosecuting authorities, [defense,] and courts.”68 The transparency of 
the FSR is such that all minutes of meetings are promptly published 
as well as regular newsletters, in addition to all the other publications 
and public consultations. It is to be applauded that the FSR is so 
transparent and engaged with the broader criminal justice 
community. In the Forensic Science Regulator Annual Report: 
November 2016–November 2017, the Regulator states, “[T]here 
should be no doubt that progress is being made. The number of 
organi[z]ations now able to demonstrate objectively the scientific 
validity of their methods and the competence of their staff has 
increased vastly. Many organi[z]ations are well on their way to 
achieving the required quality standards.”69 However, the Regulator 
concedes that this is an “ongoing process,” and her report goes on to 
detail the challenges still facing the FSR, some of which we detail 
below.70 
                                                                                                                 
 67. TULLY, supra note 50, at 33. 
 68. GILLIAN TULLY, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, ANNUAL REPORT: NOVEMBER 2014–NOVEMBER 
2015, at 4 (2015), http://www.forensic-access.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/24517-
2015_FSR_Annual_Report_v1_0_final_153002.pdf [https://perma.cc/J65H-PQMP]. 
 69. TULLY, supra note 50, at 3. 
 70. Id. 
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A.   Continuing Challenges to Forensic Regulation 
The Regulator was intended as an oversight body for all forensic 
science providers in the UK, setting national quality standards and 
ensuring compliance with these standards and the codes of practice. 
However, there are ongoing challenges to ensure that all providers—
most importantly the police, but also small businesses and experts 
called upon by the defense—seek and achieve accreditation. The 
persistent lack of compliance from some providers continues to be a 
problem, particularly in light of the government’s refusal to legislate 
both to provide the Regulator with real powers in the face of 
noncompliance and to put an enhanced admissibility test of scientific 
evidence in the courts on a statutory basis. Without these legislative 
reforms, the Regulator continues to be stymied in her efforts. There 
have also been significant challenges to the FSR in maintaining a 
steady hand in a turbulent marketplace, with financial pressures on 
both police and private providers seeing significant turmoil. These 
challenges, and the consequences of failure in these areas, will be 
considered before turning to look at whether the introduction of the 
FSR has raised standards across forensic science and the 
complexities of regulation that are revealed by consideration of the 
UK model. 
B.   Incomplete Accreditation and Lack of Compliance 
When published, the Codes were accompanied by a timetable for 
achieving compliance. In her first annual report in 2015, Dr. Gillian 
Tully claimed that “much progress” had been made towards 
compliance.71 However, in the third (current) business plan, the aims 
include the primary goal of full compliance by the end of March 
2017.72 Given that the adoption of the Regulator’s quality framework 
was the primary aim of the FSR at the outset a decade ago,73 it is a 
                                                                                                                 
 71. TULLY, supra note 68, at 4. 
 72. Id. at 16. 
 73. Id. at 4. 
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concern that the Regulator is now reporting in 2018 that there are still 
significant gaps in compliance.74 In particular, the message is not 
positive for small or “micro-businesses” who “have chosen, for 
financial reasons, not to move towards gaining accreditation.”75 In 
April 2016—as part of collaborative efforts by the Chartered Society 
of Forensic Science, the FSR, and UKAS to create a suitable 
accreditation scheme for sole- and smaller-scale forensic providers—
a survey of over 70 forensic scientists found approximately 35% of 
providers were either accredited or working towards accreditation 
while 65% held no accreditation.76 Although the survey did not 
capture whether a forensic provider was represented by single or 
multiple participants, it provided a worrying insight into the current 
landscape of accreditation in England and Wales when including 
small and micro-providers. 
The Regulator has often highlighted the difficulties in securing 
accreditation, and the Select Committee, in 2016, echoed particular 
concerns about police noncompliance, stating that the government 
“must be clear that while some police forces may face particular 
challenges in securing accreditation, there must be no failure to meet 
the Regulator’s deadlines.”77 For police in-house activities, there is a 
significant lag between increasing forensic activities undertaken and 
the adoption of relevant quality management systems (QMS). 
Previous QMS (via accreditation to ISO 9001) targeted limited 
activities such as DNA recovery and fingerprint enhancement,78 but 
                                                                                                                 
 74. TULLY, supra note 50, at 3. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Engagement Workshop, 86 INTERFACES 4, 4–6 (2016). Sole traders were 32% of respondents; 
14% represented SME-small providers (50–249 staff), 34% for SME-micro (2–9 staff), 8% for SME-
medium providers, and 12% for large providers (250 or more staff). Id. 
 77. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, FORENSIC SCIENCE STRATEGY, 2016–17, HC, ¶ 55 
(UK), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmsctech/501/50102.htm 
[https://perma.cc/PQ2W-DSZV]. 
 78. See HOME OFFICE, FORENSIC SCIENCE STRATEGY: A NATIONAL APPROACH TO FORENSIC 
SCIENCE DELIVERY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 2016, Cm. 9217, at 9 (UK) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/506683/54493_Cm_9217
_Forensic_Science_Strategy_Print_ready.pdf [https://perma.cc/BC3R-G8L8]. Current reports show that 
the number of police forces with accredited QMS for DNA recovery and fingerprint enhancement are 
thirty-four and thirty-six respectively, with sixteen units accredited to other areas. Id. at 11–14. 
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they do not cover all activities now undertaken by police. For 
example, there is no uniform protocol for the classification of 
firearms across forces involved in the provision of firearms evidence. 
Even with UKAS appending supplementary standards to 
ISO17025 to make it forensic-specific, no standard can truly regulate 
every aspect of a practitioner’s work, even in a highly regulated 
laboratory environment. Even more difficult, if not impossible, is 
effective oversight of crime scene examination and evidence 
retrieval, particularly where police personnel work without external 
supervision. Scenes of crime examinations pose significant 
challenges and while included within the Regulator’s accreditation 
schedule (under the ISO17020 standard), few police scientific 
support services are currently accredited.79 Yet, effective oversight of 
evidence management is essential if evidence generated from crime 
scenes is to be relied upon. 
The latest annual report notes that there has been a particular 
failure to secure accreditation in relation to digital forensics, and, at 
the time of this writing, the deadline of October 2018 for fingerprint 
comparison is fast approaching without confidence of full 
compliance by that date (having been moved back substantially on 
several occasions).80 The provision of digital forensic evidence is of 
particular concern at a time when there is a reported decrease in the 
demand for traditional forensic techniques, such as DNA and 
fingerprints, while the demand for digital forensics is increasing.81 
Although there has been significant progress in terms of method 
validation and staff competence—driven by the October 2017 
deadline for achieving accreditation—as of January 2018, up to thirty 
commercial organizations are providing digital forensics yet just four 
                                                                                                                 
 79. ISO-17025 Mandatory for Digital Forensics in the Criminal Justice System, INTAFORENSICS 
(Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.intaforensics.com/2017/09/19/iso-17025-mandatory-for-digital-forensics-
in-the-criminal-justice-system/ [https://perma.cc/X3SF-665J]. 
 80. TULLY, supra note 50, at 2. 
 81. John Flatley, Crime in England and Wales; Year Ending June 2017, OFF. FOR NAT’L STATS., 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandandw
ales/june2017 [https://perma.cc/VS5S-HSBU] (last visited July 8, 2018). 
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have gained ISO17025 accreditation.82 The Regulator has particular 
concerns about micro-businesses and sole traders in digital forensics 
postponing the effort and cost of accreditation until the Regulator has 
powers to force their hand, especially when, “[a]rguably, the risks are 
higher for sole traders, some of whom may not be in regular 
scientific debate with colleagues and may over time become outdated 
or even marginalized in their opinions.”83 
C.   The Regulator’s Powers 
Achieving full compliance then remains challenging, and yet the 
Regulator must strive towards this goal with no significant powers. 
The FSR was created under the Royal Prerogative, with no statutory 
basis and no powers to enforce standards. The FSR is prevented from 
using any “direct economic measures,” such as fines or other 
monetary incentives, disincentives, or penalties.84 The FSR instead 
relies upon indirect measures to secure compliance, including 
“harnessing active support from key stakeholders” and using 
“informal sanctions,” such as: 
[d]eveloping a climate within which suppliers who are 
unable to evidence compliance with quality standards will 
find it difficult to secure contracts to supply forensic 
science services to police forces and others; [and] 
[e]ncouraging courts and counsel to expect testimony given 
by expert witnesses to be underpinned by evidence that the 
science complies with the requisite quality standards.85 
In the 2017 annual report, the FSR asserts that those providers “not 
moving towards compliance should be in no doubt that their services 
will gradually receive fewer commissions and their practitioners will 
                                                                                                                 
 82. TULLY, supra note 50, at 11. 
 83. Id. 
 84. RENNISON, supra note 26, at 1. 
 85. Id. at 4. 
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face more challenges in court.”86 Frustration with the lack of 
government action is now apparent, evidenced by the Regulator 
setting out a chronology of unfulfilled government pronouncements 
dating back to 2005 that promised the Regulator powers. In 2011, the 
Select Committee recommended again that statutory powers be 
granted, a proposal that the government agreed to keep “under 
review.”87 The Select Committee made the same recommendation 
again in 2013, demanding action by March 2014.88 This led to a 
public consultation, which the government responded to in July 2015, 
stating that support for statutory powers had been found to be very 
high, and the issue would be addressed in the forthcoming Forensic 
Science Strategy.89 
The following year duly saw publication of the Forensic Science 
Strategy, where the government proclaimed a vision for forensic 
science that includes “a clearer system of governance to ensure 
quality standards and proper ethical oversight, and a cost effective 
service that delivers . . . robust and relevant forensic evidence.”90 The 
document asserts that the “legitimacy and capability of forensic 
science” will be enhanced with proposals developed “to give the 
Forensic Science Regulator statutory powers, put the current remit 
and the associated Codes of Practice on a statutory basis[,] and 
enable the Forensic Science Regulator to investigate noncompliance 
where necessary.”91 The Select Committee was unconvinced and 
“left with serious doubts about the [g]overnment’s commitment to 
deliver this.”92 Yet, in 2017, the Regulator reported, “[I]t is becoming 
                                                                                                                 
 86. TULLY, supra note 50, at 3. 
 87. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, THE FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICE, SEVENTH REPORT, 
2010–12, HC 855, at 80 (UK). 
 88. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, THE FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICE, SECOND REPORT, 
2013–14, HC 610, at 62 (UK). 
 89. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, FORENSIC SCIENCE: RESEARCH COUNCILS UK 
RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE’S SECOND REPORT OF SESSION, SIXTH SPECIAL REPORT, 2013–2014, HC 
843, at 9. 
 90. HOME OFFICE, FORENSIC SCIENCE STRATEGY, 2016, Cm. 9217, at 6 (UK). 
 91. Id. at 7, 15. 
 92. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, THE FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICE, FOURTH REPORT, 
2016–17, HC 501, at 24. 
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clear that not all police forces are fully committed to reaching the 
required standards. . . . Statutory powers for the Regulator are now 
needed in order that those organi[z]ations that have not committed 
the resource and effort required to attain the standards can be induced 
to do so.”93 
In Parliament later that year, the Minister of State for Policing and 
the Fire Service stated, “[W]e committed to place the Forensic 
Science Regulator on a statutory footing by the end of this 
Parliament. We are seeking the appropriate parliamentary 
opportunity to do that.”94 As of January 2018, while appearing 
tantalizingly close, the “clearer statutory role” promised has still not 
been forthcoming, and proposals for the powers have not yet been 
publicly revealed. The Regulator says that the situation is 
“disappointing.”95 
Studies have shown a significant correlation between strong and 
effective regulatory frameworks and sector outcomes,96 and critics of 
the FSR can point to its inability to authoritatively enforce the 
adoption and compliance of the standards.97 The Codes are not 
mandated by law, but their compliance is meant to be “not 
optional.”98 Yet, providers lacking accreditation are still able to 
undertake work while others “that have met the quality standards 
                                                                                                                 
 93. GILLIAN TULLY, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, ANNUAL REPORT: NOVEMBER 2015–NOVEMBER 
2016, at 7, 9 (Jan. 6, 2017), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/581653/FSR_Annual_Re
port_v1.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZDW-MKTL]. 
 94. 27 Nov. 2017, Parl Deb HC (2017) col. 28 (UK) 
https://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2017-11-27b.22.10 [https://perma.cc/4F42-9Q8J]. 
 95. TULLY, supra note 50, at 33. 
 96. CARY COGLIANESE, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., EXPERT PAPER NO. 1, 
MEASURING REGULATORY PERFORMANCE: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF REGULATION AND 
REGULATORY POLICY 35 (2012), https://www.oecd.org/gov/Regulatory-
policy/1_coglianese%20web.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6YY-TGU8]. 
 97. Written Evidence Submitted by the Criminal Cases Review Commission (FST0006), HOUSES OF 
PARLIAMENT (Mar. 2016), 
http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Science%20and
%20Technology/Forensic%20Science%20Strategy/written/31154.html%20Accessed%2030%20January
%202018 [https://perma.cc/3P3B-QHA8]. 
 98. 4 GILLIAM TULLY, FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, CODES OF PRACTICE AND CONDUCT 2 (2017). 
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have not yet been fully rewarded through the contracting process.”99 
Like its predecessor the CRFP, the FSR is ultimately hampered by 
lack of enforcement powers. This has also permitted providers—most 
obviously the police—the ability to dictate the pace of adoption of 
quality standards. Accreditation remains an additional but optional 
“cost,” with some providers—including the police—avoiding the 
stringent quality measures required for accreditation.100 
D.   Forensic Regulation and the Courts 
Without statutory powers, the Regulator relies upon cooperation 
and external requirements, such as the Criminal Procedure Rules and 
Criminal Practice Directions, to effect compliance with the Codes.101 
Prosecutors, lawyers, and judges are thereby incorporated into the 
quality control machinery for forensic science. However, this is 
frustrated by courts that continue to admit evidence from 
nonaccredited laboratories or experts (which they are perfectly 
entitled to do). The courts in England and Wales are required to make 
decisions about admissibility in line with the Criminal Practice 
Directions, which gives a list of factors to consider, ultimately hoping 
this will ensure only “sufficiently reliable” scientific evidence is 
admitted at trial.102 But are they competent to make informed choices 
and decisions? Are the police mindful of such criteria, particularly 
when the majority of forensic evidence never reaches a courtroom 
and may simply be used to “steer” a police inquiry or be used as 
“intelligence”? 
The gatekeeping role of trial judges in ensuring the reliability of 
expert evidence has been extensively discussed in common law 
jurisdictions with admissibility standards widely debated.103 
                                                                                                                 
 99. TULLY, supra note 50, at 3. 
 100. TULLY, supra note 98, at 2. 
 101. See, e.g., Criminal PD 2015 [2015] EWCA Crim 1567, [11], https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/crim-pd-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/98NQ-AEAV]. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Carole McCartney, Legal Rules, Forensic Science and Wrongful Convictions, in ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5 (G.J.N Bruinsma & D.L. Weisburd eds., 2014). 
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However, attempts at scientific rigor have encountered many 
challenges in adversarial courtrooms. The admission and examination 
of scientific evidence in English criminal trials is subject to a 
complex set of evidentiary rules and procedural practices, which do 
not smoothly align with accepted scientific principles. While trial 
counsel can always cross-examine an expert witness on the expert’s 
qualifications, experience, and expertise, neither lawyers nor judges 
are generally well qualified to assess scientific practice or 
standards,104 with courts still “unable to tell the difference between 
‘expert opinion’ and ‘scientific evidence,’ too often retreating into 
the simplistic default assumption that everything said by a bona fide 
expert is necessarily ‘scientific.’”105 
In lieu of requiring formal registration or professional accreditation 
as a precondition of admissibility, courts might rationally opt instead 
to insist upon forensic professionals working within an “accredited” 
or quality-assured laboratory (or equivalent environment). This 
transposes quality assurance from the individual to the institutional 
level. What we have seen, however, is institutional accreditation 
remains patchy, with many gaps, particularly among police 
organizations and small businesses (especially those who undertake 
defense work). The flaws with this regulatory framework remain in a 
marketplace where accreditation is expensive yet optional, and police 
are continuing to take forensic work in-house without seeking 
accreditation. 
E.   Police Provision and the Forensic “Market” 
The FSR was expected to fill the vacuum of regulation and solve 
the problems identified in a growing number of critical reports. Yet, 
the existence of a regulator was to prove even more critical when the 
government announced at the end of 2010 that it was to close the 
                                                                                                                 
 104. See Carole McCartney, John Cassella & Paul Chin, Lowering the Drawbridges: Forensic and 
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Forensic Science Service, a body previously looked to for national 
standards and advice, heralding a move by the UK into unchartered 
waters: a completely private national forensic science market.106 The 
FSR had referred to a “fully functioning market with the right 
services, at the right price, delivered to the appropriate standard” in 
the first business plan in 2008,107 stating that it was essential for the 
integrity of the criminal justice system that “a level playing field 
exists for all suppliers and that quality standards are maintained in 
the face of the growing market and increased competition.”108 The 
role and success of the FSR was then crucial to ensuring the 
sustainability of a wholly profit-driven marketplace and the 
avoidance of a “race to the bottom.” 
Closure of the Forensic Science Service and public sector austerity 
measures have encouraged police services to take more forensic work 
in-house. While the lack of accurate or accessible data on forensic 
science services spending has been regularly identified as 
problematic,109 the Home Office admits to approximately a 40% 
decline in police spending on external forensic services between 
2010 and 2015–2016,110 with expected further falls of 3% in 2016–
2017.111 Independent research concludes that “the continued fall in 
spending put[s] more pressure on the [private sector forensic service 
providers’] turnover and profitability and, therefore, poses questions 
about the sustainability of the market.”112 
While the police increase their forensic workload, the marketplace 
for forensic service providers then shrinks, leaving providers 
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vulnerable and the market lacking resilience. Indeed, there have been 
few “success” stories of flourishing businesses with “big” players 
cross-subsidizing the forensic arms of their business. Of the “full 
service forensics providers,”113 LGC Forensics recently sold its 
business to a European company,114 while Key Forensics, the third of 
the big three providers, went into administration in January 2018, 
leaving just two providers standing.115 Meanwhile, many small 
businesses have been unable to continue operating. This has led to a 
dangerous situation with respect to available expertise in some 
disciplines, particularly fiber analysis and other less often used 
techniques. The Regulator reports that there are now only twelve 
fully qualified toxicology reporting officers in England and Wales.116 
Demonstrating the fragility of the market and the risks that this poses, 
the collapse of digital forensics providers can leave police and 
defense solicitors trying to retrieve themselves, and raising 
significant problems over chain of custody authentication. The 
Metropolitan Police have also been forced into spending millions of 
pounds to keep Key Forensics afloat for three months, while they 
finished work on thousands of live criminal cases from thirty police 
forces.117 
Such business failures require expensive contingency plans, and 
yet the privatization of the market was intended to save government 
money by introducing competition, which would lead to a reduction 
in the price of services. By creating a competitive market where 
prices must be low to win contracts, some forensic providers are 
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unable to continue supplying cost-effective services. This becomes 
even more problematic by additionally asking struggling providers to 
meet the significant costs of accreditation. The Regulator has 
commented that it may not be simply a matter of the 
commercialization of forensic science, but that “too much money has 
been and is continuing to be driven out of forensic science 
provision.”118 
At the same time as police forces undertaking more forensics work 
internally creates risks to the market, “[p]rivate sector companies are 
concerned that police force laboratories may be able to operate more 
cheaply by using police premises without charge or by delaying 
meeting UK accreditation standards.”119 As seen, police in-house 
forensic services are not yet uniformly subject to the same quality 
standards that apply to commercial providers, even though it was 
stated in the original 2008 business plan that “differential standards 
would operate against the public interest and increase the risk of 
challenge in the courts.”120 It is difficult to see how lower standards 
for police forensics could be in the public interest, and such different 
standards increase the risk of flawed results being relied upon or 
challenged in the courts. Indeed, the police-led initial screening and 
selection of exhibits for testing is often the most critical point in the 
forensic process. Poor decision-making at this juncture, 
contamination of exhibits, or weak chain of custody records 
jeopardize any further testing that may be undertaken under stricter 
quality regimes. Criminal prosecutions, such as the infamous Irish 
Republican Army bombing in Omagh, were ultimately defeated by 
poor police practices at the crime scene and an ambiguous chain of 
custody for exhibits.121 
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III.   Raising Standards in Forensic Science? 
Given that the FSR was created in the shadow of miscarriages of 
justice and concerns about the quality of forensic science provision, 
with the ultimate aim of regulation being the assurance that all 
forensic evidence is of a high quality, have standards been raised in 
the UK? A reliable answer would require an accurate gauge to 
measure standards pre- and post-creation of the FSR, which does not 
exist. But if one were to expect that errors, mistakes, or misconduct 
were now becoming consigned to history, then the FSR role in 
investigating complaints would be diminishing. Yet, the converse is 
true: increasing numbers of cases are being reported to the FSR for 
investigation. While it may be reassuring that at least now we are 
hearing of errors and that the standards regime ensures that errors are 
now recognized and addressed, there is still ample room for concern. 
By 2013, sixty complaints were received by the first FSR during 
his five-year tenure.122 Between 2015 and 2016, however, quality 
complaints rose from thirty-six to fifty-seven, rising again to sixty-
five in 2016–2017,123 with an increase in the complexity of the 
reported issues and risks categorized as low, medium, or high 
according to the severity of the failure and potential consequences. 
Fourteen complaints were considered “high risk” in 2016–2017.124 
Some cases have been “near misses,” such as DNA contamination at 
the LGC forensic laboratory in 2012.125 Adam Scott had been 
charged with rape in October 2011 after a plastic tray containing a 
sample of his DNA (from an unconnected, earlier sample) was re-
used in the analysis of a swab from the rape victim, providing a DNA 
“match” in the rape case.126 He denied traveling the 190 miles from 
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his home to the scene of the crime, and his lawyer pressed for further 
testing, uncovering the error, despite LGC Forensics initially failing 
to consider contamination when the investigating officer raised 
concerns about the DNA match.127 Charges were eventually dropped, 
while some 26,000 other samples were re-tested with no further 
errors identified.128 In another contamination case, during a lengthy 
and perplexing police investigation into the death of an MI6 
employee, forensic scientists provided police with a DNA profile 
from the bag in which the body was found.129 The police 
subsequently spent a year attempting to trace the individual 
responsible for leaving the DNA, to no avail. It was later discovered 
that an individual manually entering the DNA profile had transposed 
the numbers “three” and “five.”130 This typographical error led to the 
costly pursuit of a non-existent individual.131 
The FSR’s post-investigation measures—ranging from advice on 
steps to avoid recurrence of the issue to modifying standards and 
guidance—are influenced by the issues raised. Again, without 
meaningful powers, such “advisory” measures are all that can be 
expected. Yet, the cost of errors and malpractice are significant, 
notwithstanding the serious risk of miscarriages of justice and the 
reputational harm to the criminal justice system. While the Codes 
seek to reduce the risk of mistakes, no accreditation can prevent a 
scientist from faltering or employees within accredited organizations 
from consciously or unwittingly engaging in malpractice. The 
expansion of private sector provision and police in-house services—
with a demand for profitable (for the private sector forensic service 
providers), cost-effective, and sustainable provision—have increased 
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the complexity of the environment with some routine forensic testing 
now subcontracted to nonspecialists or undertaken by less qualified 
police personnel. 
And yet there is still heavy reliance upon the professional integrity 
of individual practitioners. It was not long ago that even forensic 
scientists themselves conceded that forensic science is not 
sufficiently well-developed as a profession to have the full 
characteristics of a profession in place.132 Practitioners may face 
institutional pressures, which are supposedly balanced by their 
scientific professionalism; however, customers demanding “useful” 
scientific assistance may refuse to pay for inconclusive test results or 
choose other providers who are more obliging. And what about the 
situation where the scientist is aware that a potentially exculpatory 
test has not been ordered? There is no legal duty to pursue every 
conceivable avenue of scientific inquiry or every possibility of 
exculpation, and police will rarely order extensive tests (with their 
eye on budgets). Private consultants are constrained by costs and 
keeping their customers happy, hoping to gain a reputation for 
satisfying consumer expectations, in order to win and retain market 
share. 
High-profile miscarriages of justice in England and Wales fan 
suspicions that scientists may be too easily influenced by the police 
when undertaking forensic testing and reporting results. The Codes 
state that all forensic practitioners should be governed by the 
principles of “independence, impartiality[,] and integrity.”133 
According to the Regulator, organizational structures do not hinder 
working toward these principles,134 yet this seems overly optimistic if 
a scientist is directly employed by, or works directly alongside, the 
police. Although one might wish to believe in the integrity of all law 
enforcement and forensic science personnel wherever institutionally 
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located, it would be naive to abandon quality assurance mechanisms 
and frameworks for wishful thinking. 
IV.   The Challenge of Forensic Regulation 
The FSR initially articulated a “risk model,” identifying five 
categories of risk: the generation of evidence which contributes to a 
miscarriage of justice (false convictions or false acquittals); evidence 
which misleads or fails to contribute where possible to a criminal 
investigation; situations where there is a “public interest” (left 
undefined); and conditions threatening market failure.135 Utilizing a 
risk model requires quantification of the “risk” posed by any 
particular procedure or practice. Thus, there must be an error rate—
corresponding to identifiable errors—or known limitations of any 
given method. However, a significant flaw in the Regulator’s risk 
model is that relevant error rates and limitations for common forensic 
science techniques remain largely undetermined. 
Even assuming the injection of significant further resources would 
provide accurate error rates, it is questionable whether risks can be 
meaningfully quantified given the inherently contextual nature of 
forensic science evidence. Without known error rates, can a 
laboratory profess to be working within acceptable parameters? Who 
decides what level of error is “acceptable”? For example, how often 
should an acceptable system of fingerprint analysis be expected to 
produce false “matches”? What range of false “matches” is 
compatible with a practitioner or laboratory performing to an 
acceptable standard? Such questions, of course, are not purely 
scientific. Acceptability turns, in part, upon the criminal justice 
system’s values and public tolerance of forensic errors. Significant 
further research into error rates, forensic techniques, technological 
limitations, and practitioner bias needs to be undertaken before an 
effective risk model can be designed and implemented. 
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Even with dedicated resources (including significant research 
funding), there are still inherent difficulties in reaching agreement on 
areas of ongoing scientific controversy. Recent debates surrounding 
Low Template DNA demonstrate that forensic scientists may become 
entrenched in opposing views.136 Yet, the risk model anticipates 
scientists providing “definite answers to regulatory problems that 
may be urgent and pressing but that science may not be able to solve 
categorically.”137 If forensic scientists themselves cannot resolve a 
dispute over whether a technique or practice is reliable, how should a 
Regulator proceed? The scientific community cannot always provide 
the unanimous answers required for risk assessment. Indeed, to 
expect them to do so is to misunderstand the nature of a scientific 
endeavour, which is always pushing against the boundaries of current 
orthodoxy. But, such disputes foster widely discrepant forensic 
practices, with techniques deemed acceptable in some countries, or 
by some forensic science providers, and rejected by others. 
The Regulator has also pointed out the gap left when accreditation 
becomes the focus of an organization ignoring other vital issues, such 
as the “loss of exhibits; compromise of exhibit integrity; method 
failures; poor performance in proficiency tests; and internal 
inconsistencies in reports not being identified.”138 There is also the 
countervailing difficulty of encouraging innovation and ongoing 
development within regulatory parameters. This demands some 
measure of regulatory flexibility and pluralism. As Stan Brown and 
Sheila Willis have argued, “it is a misconception that best practice 
standard protocols must be set that must then be followed by all. That 
approach would set forensic science in aspic and be 
counterproductive.”139 A difficult balance must be struck between 
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strict adherence to quality-assured protocols and ensuring that 
practitioners can still innovate and exercise professional judgment in 
difficult cases to achieve the optimal outcome. 
A risk-based regulatory system does not ensure quality but is 
aimed at prioritizing or mitigating crises. The recent scandal at 
Randox Testing Services (RTS)140 is the perfect example of post-
crisis regulation, with the Regulator called upon to examine the 
events at one toxicology laboratory. The Regulator explained, 
“Although RTS held accreditation to the appropriate quality standard, 
the malpractice was not discovered by the usual quality checks.”141 
The laboratory was ISO certified and yet quality control data were 
manipulated, resulting in a major police inquiry (with two individuals 
facing criminal charges), impacting a reported 10,000 cases that all 
now need some degree of re-investigation.142 This is similar to the 
food regulatory system in the European Union, which might be 
viewed as “a prime example of regulation in response to major crises 
rather than in anticipation of everyday problems.”143 In practice, 
political crisis induced by a wrongful conviction or public scandal 
may be necessary to provoke regulatory intervention,144 but this 
reaction may come too late for individuals who cannot be adequately 
compensated for their loss of liberty, or a public whose trust in 
science and the administration of justice is irreparably damaged.145 
Regulators need to be omnipotent and very quick on their feet. In 
reality, because “regulatory agencies have limited staff and financial 
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resources, there will always be competition between various 
functions for priority.”146 The field of forensic science constantly 
faces new challenges, and, realistically, no regulatory system could 
always respond or react quickly enough to new “threats.” In addition, 
the classic regulatory risk analysis approach relies heavily on 
scientific risk assessment, typically taking little (if any) account of 
sociological, economic, ethical, or even legal considerations. 
CONCLUSION 
The introduction of the Regulator in the UK was a significant 
innovation, intended to create a generic standard for forensic science 
providers with “a light touch” in steering service providers toward 
accreditation. While NAS recommended mandatory accreditation for 
both laboratories and scientists as well as sanctions against 
transgressors (but not automatic exclusion of substandard 
evidence),147 the FSR has had to rely upon “soft” implementation. 
The adoption of the FSR standards—whether by police forces or 
commercial providers—remains voluntary, and consequently, partial. 
The Regulator still lacks meaningful enforcement powers, and 
despite a promising start, regulation of UK forensic sciences is still 
too often patchy, superficial, and lacking teeth. Of course, like the 
rest of the UK public sector, the Regulator must contend with 
financial stringency. Indeed, the entire criminal justice system—but 
forensic science services in particular—is being starved of funds, 
with commentators warning that the entire system is on the brink of 
collapse.148 
Ultimately, the role of the FSR was envisaged as far more 
significant than simply setting and monitoring standards, ensuring 
accreditation, and dealing with complaints. The overarching goal was 
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to answer those critics who decried the contribution that forensic 
science appeared to make toward miscarriages of justice. The FSR, 
after all, was born out of recommendations contained in scathing 
reports often following high-profile wrongful convictions. The FSR 
responds that reducing the risk of quality failings would impede or 
prevent “the identification, prosecution[,] and conviction of 
offenders.”149 Declaring success in this role would require making 
some grand claims, which would be extremely difficult to 
satisfactorily demonstrate. There clearly remains an obvious risk of 
wrongful convictions with reliance upon unsupervised or unregulated 
scientists, or upon unscientific techniques. This risk is increased 
when police personnel are working unsupervised and clearly lacking 
independence and impartiality. 
Poor scientific and professional standards destabilize public 
confidence in forensic science and consequently have an impact upon 
confidence in the criminal process. Wrongful convictions may 
flourish in a culture that fails to scrutinize and question forensic 
evidence; instances of flawed science, charlatans, nondisclosure, and 
misinterpretation of evidence are easy to locate both domestically 
and internationally. In a climate where adversarialism is being 
eroded, where science is granted special credence, and expert 
witnesses gain credibility as guarantors of “accurate” findings of 
guilt, there can then be created a dangerous “technological 
tyranny.”150 
Given that it is essential that all forensic evidence is reliable and 
valid—whether used at trial, during an investigation, or held as 
intelligence by law enforcement agencies—there must be systems in 
place to ensure the quality of forensic evidence from the very outset 
of the criminal process, until the very end. This requires regulation 
and oversight of forensic science from the crime scene to the 
courtroom; quality assurance standards for the education, training, 
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and operation of forensic scientists; and the quality assurance and 
accreditation of scientists’ working environments and practices. Yet, 
there is clearly a need for more attention to the delivery of forensic 
services, practitioner training, standard setting, monitoring, and 
implementation across the entire sector. Further, research is required 
to determine error rates and limitations of particular techniques and 
to develop effective institutional responses to risks of observer bias 
and human error.151 Many of the safeguards against wrongful 
convictions must reside within fair and rational legal rules and the 
professional working cultures. Such safeguards are fostered by 
appropriate training and management, and assured by accreditation, 
quality assurance, and validation processes among the police, 
prosecution, forensic science, judiciary, and advocates. Nevertheless, 
whatever care is expended, mistakes are inevitable, and so effective 
processes for remedying error remain essential even after conviction.
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